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748 (1976). However, the Court stated 
that the proper analysis is guided by the 
four-prong test found in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).54 U.S.L.W. 
at 4960. 
Applying the first prong of the Central 
Hudson test, the Court held that "[t]he par-
ticular kind of commercial speech at issue 
here ... concerns a lawful activity and is 
not misleading or fraudulent." Id. Moving 
on to the next prong, the Court found that 
regulatory scheme passed muster as "the 
Puerto Rico Legislature's interest in the 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens 
constitutes a 'substantial' governmental in-
terest." Id. The third prong was also found 
to be met as the restrictions on commercial 
speech "directly advance" the government's 
asserted substantial interest by attempting 
to reduce the demand for casino gambling. 
Finally, the Court found that the restric-
tions on commercial speech, as narrowly 
construed by the lower court, are no more 
extensive than necessary to serve the gov-
ernment's interest since they "will not af-
fect advertising of casino gambling aimed 
at tourists, but will apply only to such ad-
vertising when aimed at the residents of 
Puerto Rico." Id. at 4961. Thus, the Court 
concluded that the regulations, as con-
strued by the lower court, were facially 
constitutional under the Central Hudson 
test. 
The Court then addressed the appellant's 
second argument that the advertising re-
strictions were constitutionally defective 
under the holdings in Carey v. Population 
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), (strik-
ing down a ban on any "advertisement or 
display" of contraceptives); and Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), (reversing 
criminal conviction based on advertisement 
of an abortion clinic). However, the Court 
found those cases where "the underlying 
conduct that was the subject of the adver-
tising restrictions was constitutionally pro-
tected and could not have been prohibited 
by the State" distinguishable from casino 
gambling which the Puerto Rico Legisla-
ture could have prohibited altogether. 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4961. Thus, the Court ar-
rived at the conclusion that "the greater 
power to completely ban casino gambling 
necessarily includes the lesser power to 
ban advertising of casino gambling." Id. 
The Court restated this new first amend-
ment analysis more generally as "it is pre-
cisely because the government could have 
enacted a wholesale prohibition of the un-
derlying conduct that it is permissible for 
the government to take the less intrusive 
step of allowing the conduct, but reducing 
the demand through restriction of adver-
tising." Id. (emphasis in original). Con-
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tinuing on, the Court observed that "[l]eg-
islative regulation of products or activities 
deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alco-
holic beverages, and prostitution has varied 
from out right prohibition on the one hand 
... to legalization of the product or activity 
with restrictions on stimulation of its de-
mand on the other hand." Id. "To rule out 
the latter intermediate kind of response 
would require more than we find in the 
First Amendment," the Court concluded. 
Thus, the restrictions on advertising were 
upheld as constitutional. 
Justice Brennan dissented, stating that 
"I see no reason why commercial speech 
should be afforded less protection than 
other types of speech where, as here, the 
government seeks to suppress commercial 
speech in order to deprive consumers of 
accurate information concerning lawful 
activity." Id. at 4962. Justice Brennan also 
disagreed with the majority's deferral "to 
what it perceives to be the determination 
by Puerto Rico's legislature that a ban on 
casino advertising aimed at residents is 
reasonable." Id. at 4963. 
Justice Stevens also dissented, finding 
that "Puerto Rico blatantly discriminates 
in its punishment of speech depending on 
the publication, audience, and words em-
ployed." Id. at 4965. 
The first part of the Court's holding sim-
ply represents an extended application of 
the Central Hudson, first amendment anal-
ysis for commercial speech. However, it 
is the Court's introduction of "the greater 
power necessarily includes the lesser power" 
language into first amendment constitu-
tional analysis which gives this case special 
significance. Expansion of this new analy-
sis, even beyond that alluded to by the 
Court in its opinion, could eventually per-
mit further erosion of the various analysis 
under the freedom of speech. For example, 
a content-based restriction could possibly 
be disguised by the "greater includes the 
lesser" analysis. It remains to be seen 
whether this is the direction the new Court, 
possibly under Justice Rehnquist, will take. 
-Eric P. Macdonell 
Frye v. Frye: MARYLAND 
REAFFIRMS THE PARENT -CHILD 
IMMUNITY RULE 
In Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542 (1986), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to 
overturn the parent-child immunity rule 
which has existed in Maryland for fifty-six 
years. The court also declined to create an 
exception to the rule for cases involving 
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 
In Frye, the plaintiffs, George L. Frye III, 
a minor, and his mother, Barbara Frye, re-
ceived injuries when the automobile in 
which they were passengers went off the 
road and collided with a culvert. At the 
time of the occurrence, the automobile 
was being operated by George L. Frye, Jr., 
who was the father and husband of the 
passengers. 
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court 
for Prince Georges County by Barbar~ 
Frye, individually and as guardian and 
next friend of George L. Frye, III, against 
George L. Frye, Jr. for damages incurred 
as a result of the defendant's negligence. 
The court granted a motion to dismiss the 
action as to Barbara Frye, individually, on 
the ground that the doctrine ofinterspousal 
immunity had been in effect upon the ac-
crual of her cause of action and thus, relief 
could not be granted. The court also dis-
missed the action brought on behalf of 
George L. Frye, III on the ground that no 
relief could be granted under the parent-
child immunity rule. 
Barbara Frye appealed to the court of 
special appeals. In the meantime, the court 
of appeals granted Mrs. Frye's request for 
the court to certify the records and pro-
ceedings before a decision was rendered by 
the court of special appeals. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that 
the parent-child immunity rule should be 
abrogated as to torts sounding in negli-
gence in light of the court's recent abroga-
tion of inters po usa 1 immunity. See Boblitz 
v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 
(1983). In the alternative, the plaintiff con-
tended that an exception should be carved 
from the parent-child immunity rule for 
motor vehicle torts. The court refused to 
create the exception. 
Parent-child immunity, a creation of the 
American judicial system, was adopted 
by the court of appeals in Schneider v. 
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
As construed in Maryland, the rule bars 
suits by a child against his or her parent 
and by a parent against his or her child for 
personal injury arising from a tort. The 
court of appeals has recognized two excep-
tions to the rule. First, the court has held 
that a minor child has a right to maintain a 
cause of action against his or her parent for 
"cruel and inhuman treatment or for ma-
licious and wanton wrongs." Mahnke v. 
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 
(1951). Secondly, the court has declined to 
extend the parent-child immunity rule to 
encompass a suit between an emancipated 
child and a parent. Waltzinger v. Birsner, 
212 Md. 107,.128 A.2d 617 (1957). 
Frye is the first case, since the adoption 
of parent-child immunity in Maryland, in 
which the court of appeals has examined 
the viability of the rule as it applies to suits 
sounding in negligence between an un-
emancipated child and a parent. In its ex-
amination of the rule, the court advanced 
several reasons for its refusal to reverse the 
parent-child immunity rule in light of the 
reversal of the interspousal immunity rule. 
The court stated that the reasons for which 
interspousal immunity was abrogated are 
inapplicable with respect to parent-child 
immunity. The doctrine of interspousal 
immunity arose from the legal fiction that 
a husband and a wife were one person at 
common law. Thus, husbands and wives 
were incapable of suing each other since, 
in effect, they would be suing themselves. 
However, no such unity has existed be-
tween parent and child. Additionally, the 
court held that the abrogation of inter-
spousal immunity was premised on changes 
which have occurred in the relationship of 
husband and wife since the adoption of 
the immunity. The court then examined 
whether the nature of the parent-child re-
lationship has changed so as to compel a 
re-examination of parent-child immunity. 
Parent-child immunity is premised on 
the responsibility of the parent for the 
training and education of the child. As a 
result, the parent has been given the right 
to exercise control and discipline over the 
child as is necessary to fulfill his or her 
parental duties. The immunity enhances 
the parent's authority to use his or her dis-
cretion to discipline and care for the child. 
Additionally, the court of appeals has de-
clared it to be the public policy of Mary-
land to preserve the peace and harmony of 
the home and to preserve discipline within 
the family. 
The court held that the parent-child im-
munity rule continues to further this pol-
icy. The court found that the parent-child 
relationship has not changed so drastically 
as to require abrogation ofparent-childim-
munity. Thus, the rule remains viable 
today. 
The court refused to decide whether, in 
light of Maryland's compulsory insurance 
laws, an exception to the parent-child im-
munity rule should be created for injuries 
resulting from the negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle. Instead, the court stated 
that compulsory motor vehicle liability in-
surance is a creation of the legislature. The 
court recognized that such an exception 
would have a significant impact on the in-
surance scheme and the public policy be-
hind it. Thus, the court held that the cre-
ation of such an exception is within the 
province of the legislature. 
The parent-child immunity rule evolved 
in the United States as a means of ensuring 
the existence of family harmony and pa-
rental authority and discretion in the dis-
cipline and care of children. Since its adop-
tion, the rule has been criticized as not 
fulfilling its functions. Evidence of disil-
lusionment with the parent -child immunity 
rule is indicated by the trend in the United 
States toward abrogation of the rule. The 
majority of states have vacated the parent-
child immunity rule, either totally or par-
tially. Most of the states which retain the 
rule in part have carved out an exception 
for suits based on the negligent operation 
of an automobile. Cognizant of this trend, 
the Maryland court of appeals refused to 
change the parent-child immunity rule. 
In light of the Frye decision, it appears 
that the parent-child immunity rule will 
remain embodied in the law of Maryland 
for some time to come. The court of ap-
peals has reaffirmed the position of the 
Maryland judiciary that a child is com-
pletely barred from maintaining a tort ac-
tion against his or her parent based upon 
negligence. 
- Sharon Gamble 
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